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BOOK REVIEW

Susan B. Boyd, Dorothy E. Chunn, Fiona Kelly and Wanda
Wiegers, Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-Legal Study of
Choice and Constraint (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2015).

Brenda Cossman*
Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-legal Study of Choice and
Constraint,1 by Susan Boyd, Dorothy Chunn, Fiona Kelly, and
Wanda Wiegers, explores the evolving social and legal context of
women who have made the decision to parent without a partner. The
authors argue that although these single mothers now have more
economic and social freedom to parent alone, they still confront a
socio-legal context that challenges their choices. Autonomous
Motherhood is an important contribution to feminist and socio-legal
literature. As the authors note, although there is a scholarly tradition
of studying women who became single mothers by separation,
divorce, or death of an intimate partner, there is a dearth of
scholarship on women who have become single mothers by choice.
The book investigates the social and legal changes in the ways in
which these single mothers have been treated. Deploying a range of
disciplinary methodologies—legal, historical, and sociological—the
authors gather empirical evidence through legislative histories, caselaw analysis, and interviews. The result is a rich interdisciplinary
socio-legal study of the choices and constraints that have faced
*

Professor of Law and Director, Bonham Centre for Sexual Diversity
Studies, University of Toronto.

1

Susan B. Boyd, Dorothy E. Chunn, Fiona Kelly and Wanda Wiegers
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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).
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women who choose to parent alone.
Interestingly, the authors choose to present their work as a coauthored book, rather than an edited collection, even though each of
the authors takes a lead role in specific chapters. It works; the book
is beautifully cohesive. Each chapter builds on the ones before, with
themes seamlessly integrated, telling a theoretically complex and
nuanced story of choice and constraints. Each of the four authors—
leading feminist socio-legal scholars in Canada and beyond—bring
their unique perspectives and strengths to Autonomous Motherhood,
which combines theoretical sophistication, rigorous legal analysis,
rich historical detail, and compelling sociological interviews. The
book reads as a paragon of feminist collaboration, where the whole
is more than the sum of its parts.
The first chapter on “Motherhood, Autonomy, Choice, and
Constraint,” for which Susan Boyd was the primary author, provides
the introduction to the study, setting out the key theoretical and
methodological objectives and approaches of the book. The authors
situate their study within the tradition of feminist critical socio-legal
studies. Their goal in tracing the transformations in the treatment of
single mothers is twofold: to demonstrate both women’s increased
choices since the 1970s and the constraints on those choices. The
authors situate the constraints squarely within the rise of the neoliberal state, emphasizing the themes of individual choice, private
responsibility for social reproduction, and formal equality. They
situate their approach to the concepts of “choice” and “autonomy”
within feminist relational theory, which rejects liberal individualism
in favour of an understanding of autonomy as constrained and
constructed.2 The chapter provides a brief review of the changing
2

The authors rely here on feminist relational scholarship such as Jennifer
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Sumi Madhok, Anne
Philllips & Kalpana Wilson, eds, Gender, Agency, and Coercion
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan UK, 2013);
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legal and demographic landscape of women who choose to be
parents without a partner, setting the stage for the chapters that
follow.
The next three chapters explore various historical
transformations in the legal regulation of single women who choose
to parent without a partner. The second chapter, “Autonomous
Mothers and the Emergence of Unmarried Fathers’ Rights to Access
and Custody,” of which Wanda Wiegers was the primary author,
traces the history of custody and access disputes over children born
to single mothers. It first examines the status of unmarried fathers
and mothers to apply for custody and access, beginning with the
common law, through the legislative reforms in the nineteenth and
twentieth century, up to the 1970s. The second part explores how the
courts assessed the applications in relation to prevailing concepts of
the child’s best interests. The chapter shows the shifts in the legal
treatment of unmarried fathers, from virtually invisible in the 1950s
towards “almost a presumption of equal parenting” beginning in the
1990s.
The third chapter, “A Person is the Child of his Natural Parents:
Illegitimacy, Law Reform, and Maternal Autonomy,” with Susan
Boyd again as the primary author, focuses more specifically on the
legislative history of illegitimacy and its abolition. It begins with a
focus on the history of financial support obligations and then shifts
to analyze the discourses of law reform abolishing or minimizing the
impact of illegitimacy. The chapter does an exemplary job of
demonstrating the contradictory effects of law: while removing the
stigma of illegitimacy from the children and its moralistic regulation
of women, the reforms also witnessed a greater focus on biological
fathers and facilitated their claims to custody and access. The
and Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy:
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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growing emphasis on formal equality between biological mothers
and fathers would create new constraints on women’s abilities to
parent autonomously.
Chapter Four, entitled “Custody and Access Disputes between
Unmarried, Non-Cohabiting Biological Parents 1945 – 2009,” with
Wanda Wiegers as the primary author, picks up on the trajectory of
the previous chapters and focuses attention on the case law. The
chapter studied 154 cases from four provinces: British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. It finds that in all
provinces except Nova Scotia, mothers received sole custody more
often than men, consistent with the trends for married parents.
However, the number of successful custody and access claims by
unmarried fathers increased over time, particularly in the 1990s and
2000s. The chapter then highlights the factors that seemed to be
particularly significant in the judicial assessment of a child’s best
interests in the context of unmarried and non-cohabiting parents,
including the importance of a relationship with the biological father.
Increasingly, the courts have enhanced fathers’ claims, emphasizing
a child’s right to know his or her father and develop a relationship
with him. As the authors argue, this has come at a cost to women
who wish to parent autonomously; their choices are constrained as
they must now often accommodate, negotiate, and facilitate the ongoing involvement of fathers.
The next two chapters change methodological direction,
presenting results from interviews with single mothers. Chapter
Five, “Women’s Experiences Of Autonomous Motherhood, 1965 –
2010: An Historical Snapshot,” with Dorothy Chunn as the lead
author, focuses on women who chose to become single mothers
between 1960 and 1980. As the authors note, there has been little
research on this cohort of autonomous mothers, and this chapter
seeks to begin to fill this knowledge gap. The interviews sought to
elicit the women’s views on the social, economic, and legal impact
of their choice to parent alone and their own ideas on the meaning of
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choice. The chapter organizes the results of the interviews along
three axes: reproductive autonomy, social reproduction, and formal
equality, each against the backdrop of the emergent neo-liberal state.
The authors argue that although the women saw themselves as
exercising autonomy in their choice to become single mothers, they
faced significant challenges in terms of the on-going privatization of
the costs of social reproduction as well as the internalization of some
more traditional norms of familial ideology. The argument is one
that is weaved throughout the book—that although women may now
face fewer challenges than in earlier periods, obstacles remain: “we
should not automatically conflate historical differences with either
progress or regression. Women who choose autonomous
motherhood today may confront fewer overt obstacles and
discrimination than their predecessors, but in some way, they face
both old and new roadblocks to making this choice.”3
Chapter Six, “Autonomous from the Start: The Narratives of
Single Mothers by Choice,” with Fiona Kelly as the primary author,
then presents the results of interviews with women who identify as
Single Mothers by Choice (“SMCs”). The sample was small—only
ten women were interviewed. Yet the qualitative results were rich
and an important contribution to a largely under-researched area.
The interviews focused on how the women made the decision to
parent alone, their experiences of social or legal barriers to doing so,
and their experience of autonomous parenting more generally. The
chapter is structured around a number of themes that emerged in the
interviews: their entitlement to parent alone, their sense of personal
responsibility for the costs of social reproduction, their experiences
of the fertility industry, their views on the importance of biological
family, and the challenges presented by the legal system. The
overarching theme of the book is again woven through the chapter:
although women have more choices to become single mothers, they
continue to face constraints and obstacles to their autonomy.
3

Boyd et al, supra note 1 at 140.
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The book concludes with “Whither Autonomous Motherhood?
Choice and Constraint,” with Susan Boyd once again as the main
author, who skillfully pulls together the findings and themes, while
offering some speculations on recent law reform and directions for
future research. The authors persuasively rearticulate their basic
argument: that single motherhood has been both enabled and
constrained over the past decades. On one hand:
The ability of women to exercise choice in
motherhood has been significantly enhanced over
recent decades as illegitimacy was largely abolished,
women gained increased opportunities in the labour
force, alternative family forms garnered greater social
and legal acceptance, reproductive technologies
became more available, and social networks emerged
for single mothers by choice.4
Yet on the other hand, these choices remain constrained by a
range of factors, including the increasing emphasis on the
importance of biological fathers, dominant conceptions of family,
and privatized social responsibility. In comparing the two cohorts of
interviewees from Chapters Five and Six, who chose to become
single mothers in very different contexts and time periods, the
authors conclude that “the change has not been as radical as might
be expected.”5 From the internalization of the strong sense of
personal financial responsibility to the challenges of reproductive
technologies, “the commonalities between our two interview cohorts
may be greater than their differences.”6

4

Ibid at 215–216.

5

Ibid at 217.

6

Ibid at 218.
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The authors then further tease out the contradictory nature of
law reform demonstrated by their study. While women obtained
more legal and social autonomy over their reproductive decisions,
over time “fathers have gained more cultural and legal capital, based
increasingly on their bio-genetic status rather than a relational
connection with the child.”7 The advent of formal equality in
parenting has presented new and formidable challenges to the ability
of women to parent autonomously.
Autonomy, Neo-liberalism, and Self-Governance
Autonomous Motherhood raises provocative questions not only
about the legal and social terrain in which single women negotiate
parenthood but also broader theoretical questions. In this section, I
engage with three concepts that emerge from the study: autonomy,
neo-liberalism, and self-governance. The first two are central to the
book; the third is a lens that I bring to reading the book.
First, autonomy—which is a central organizing principle of the
book. The idea of “autonomous motherhood” is intended to capture
the phenomenon of women who choose to have children—
biologically or by adoption—with no partner. The authors engage in
a nuanced analysis, framing the question of autonomous motherhood
in the ambivalent space between choice and coercion. They locate
their conception of autonomy within the feminist literature on
relational autonomy. While recognizing the agency of these
women—and the choices that they make to parent alone—these
choices are contextualized within the broader context of unequal
power relationships, institutions, ideologies, and structures. The
authors maintain a productive tension between choice and constraint,
with the idea of autonomy vacillating between the poles of choice
and constraint.

7

Ibid at 219.
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As a feminist and queer scholar long concerned with principles
of liberty and freedom, I welcomed the affirmation of women’s
autonomy with which the book opened and is centrally concerned.
Yet autonomy—“Autonomous Motherhood?”—remains framed as a
question. The authors maintain an ambivalent relationship with
autonomy and choice throughout the book. Often “choice” or
“autonomy” appear in quotation marks. The language of choice used
and indeed emphasized by the women in their interviews is
problematized against the backdrop of the many constraints and
obstacles that they confronted. It is of course an academic
imperative to probe beneath the surface; yet the extent to which the
authors do so seems to depend on what the subjects were expressing.
Choice was problematized. Constraints, rather less so. The authors
conclude that women now have more autonomy, yet they also
downplay the progress, arguing that the commonalities of the
constraints may outweigh the differences in the degree to which the
women are able to exercise autonomy. The final chapter is
interestingly entitled “Whither Autonomy?”—once again, framed as
a question. It struck me as interesting that the lead would be about
withering, rather than say, flourishing. While the book certainly
demonstrates the continuation of structural inequalities within which
women exercise choices to become single parents, the findings
equally support a conclusion that these constraints are less than in
the past—a conclusion that the authors indeed acknowledge and
affirm. It is perhaps simply a question of emphasis. And my
inclination would be to weight the enhanced a little more and the
constrained a little less.
Having said that, Autonomous Motherhood provides a
fascinating case study for feminist and other critical scholars
interested in reconceptualizing autonomy. While the authors
emphasize the relational dimensions of autonomy, further
scholarship could delve deeper into more particular
conceptualizations of relational autonomy revealed in and through
their study. For example, Mackenzie and Stoljar, whom the authors
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cite, have meticulously mapped out the field of the multiple feminist
critiques of autonomy.8 As they write,
The term "relational autonomy," as we understand it,
does not refer to a single unified conception of
autonomy but is rather an umbrella term, designating
a range of related perspectives. These perspectives are
premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that
persons are socially embedded and that agents'
identities are formed within the context of social
relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting
social determinants, such as race, class, gender, and
ethnicity.9
Autonomous Motherhood certainly shares these basic
convictions of autonomy as embedded in social relationships:
autonomy is constituted in and through social relationships. Yet, as
Mackenzie and Stoljar demonstrate, there are in fact many divergent
critiques and conceptions of relational autonomy united under this
basic claim. Several appear to be at play in Autonomous
Motherhood. There are echoes of the metaphysical relational critique
that rejects the individualism on which traditional autonomy is
based, insisting instead on the multiple ways in which individuals
are “constituted by the social relations in which they stand.”10 There
is an explicit gesture towards care critiques, such as Jennifer
Nedelsky’s work: a care critique of traditional autonomy that gives
normative primacy to relationships of care and focuses on
8

Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 2.

9

Ibid at 4.

10

Ibid at 7–8. Mackenzie and Stoljar break down various versions of this
critique, ultimately arguing that “the concept of individual autonomy
should be distinguished from individualistic conceptions of individual
autonomy.”
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interpersonal relationships.11 The authors repeatedly emphasize the
idea that “relationships are key to women’s choices about being
single mothers,” and “constructive supportive relationships are key
to successful parenting.”12 There is also a heavy reliance on what
Mackenzie and Stoljar refer to loosely (and somewhat awkwardly)
as “postmodern critiques,” which focus on the ways in which agency
is implicated in relations of power and oppression. Autonomous
Motherhood is very explicitly engaged with the ways in which
“socio-economic structures . . . can seriously inhibit women’s ability
to make autonomous choices.”13
Mackenzie and Stoljar go on to highlight the major themes of
feminist efforts to reconceptualize relational autonomy. First, there
is a question of the implications for autonomy of a “richer
conception of agency:”
For example, conceptualizing agents as emotional,
embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as
rational, creatures highlights the importance to
autonomy of features of agents that have received
little discussion in the literature, such as memory,
imagination, and emotional dispositions and
attitudes.14
A second concern is the analysis of the “specific ways in which
oppressive socialization and oppressive social relationships can
impede autonomous agency”—a question of central concern to
Autonomous Motherhood.15 But they further break this concern into
11

Nedelsky, supra note 2.

12

Boyd et al, supra note 1 at 213.

13

Ibid at 21.

14

Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 2 at 21.

15

Ibid at 22.
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three interrelated levels:
…the processes of formation of an agent's desires,
beliefs, and emotional attitudes, including beliefs and
attitudes about herself. . . . The second level is that of
the development of the competencies and capacities
necessary for autonomy, including capacities for selfreflection, self-direction, and self-knowledge.
...
The third level is that of an agent's ability to act on
autonomous desires or to make autonomous choices.
Autonomy can be impeded at this level not just by
overt restrictions on agents' freedom but also by
social norms, institutions, practices, and relationships
that effectively limit the range of significant options
available to them.”16
Autonomous Motherhood is clearly, if not always explicitly,
situated within these various levels of reconceptualizing autonomy.
It might be analytically productive to further tease out the different
currents of the critique of autonomy and the reconceptualization of
relational autonomy along the lines suggested by MacKenzie and
Stoljar. While Autonomous Motherhood is strong on many of the
oppressive social relationships that might impede autonomy, the
formation of autonomous desires and capacities for self-direction
seem under-developed in the book.
MacKenzie and Stoljar’s mapping also helps to highlight
another noticeable absence from Autonomous Motherhood, namely
the question of affect: emotions and subjectively experienced
feelings. The absence is ironic perhaps in a study of motherhood,
saturated as it is in emotionalism. There is no sense of affect of the
mothers interviewed, yet affect no doubt plays a crucial role in
decisions related to having, keeping, parenting, and reflecting on
16

Ibid.
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children. And the question of the formation of affect, the capacity
for self-reflection on affect, and the ability to act on that affect are
three levels for further consideration of the relational autonomy of
women who choose to parent alone. Autonomous Motherhood
provides a rich legal and sociological case study through which
future scholarship might delve more deeply into these distinct
questions of relational autonomy.
The concept of neo-liberalism is also a central theme running
through Autonomous Motherhood. “Neo-liberalism” has become a
capacious term, with multiple, even contradictory, meanings,
deployed across a broad range of political, economic, sociological,
and legal literatures. The authors deploy the term without much
contextualization. It appears in the opening chapter and then
throughout the book to refer to privatizing financial responsibility,
individual responsibility for the cost of reproduction, formal
equality, and gender-neutral family law. While the idea of
privatizing the costs of social reproduction and individual fiscal
responsibility are well-established features of the rise of the neoliberal state, some other features could have used a bit more
elaboration. For example, the authors describe father’s rights
arguments about parity in parenting as “essentially neo-liberal.” It
may well be—but the claim is asserted rather than elaborated.
There is also an interesting tension in the arguments about the
privatization of fiscal responsibility since the 1970s—an argument I
acknowledge has been directed towards my own scholarship on
privatization in family law.17 Shelley Gavigan, for example, has
17

For this critique of my work on privatization: Brenda Cossman and Judy
Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law and the Challenge of Feminism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002), in particular my chapter “Family
Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of the Reprivatization
Project”; see also Shelley Gavigan “Something Old, Something New?
Retheorising Patriarch Relations and Privatization from the Outskirts of
Family Law” (2012) 13 Theor Inq L 271.
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argued that the claims of privatization radically overstate the extent
to which the welfare state ever took responsibility for financial
support: “The Keynesian approach to social policy and the family
neither attempted nor sought to dislodge, or render public, the most
significant source of women's poverty and inequality in the labor
force: their primary responsibility for the care and wellbeing of their
children. . . . Primary responsibility for "private" family relations has
never not been located within the family—discursively or
otherwise.”18 While I do not entirely agree with Gavigan’s dismissal
of the analytic purchase of reprivatization, her critique does suggest
that those of us deploying the concept need to be more cautious in
not overstating our claims.
While Autonomous Motherhood is very much within the
tradition of scholarship claiming that the rise of the neo-liberal state
involved a marked shift in the discourses of self-sufficiency and
fiscal responsibility, there is also a way in which its arguments
actually endorse a more modest claim. Some of the analysis in the
early chapters downgrades the claim about privatization, in so far as
it demonstrates the extent to which these costs of social reproduction
have always been privatized. The authors note that before the advent
of the welfare state, the state sought to privatize these costs and the
social welfare state never fully socialized these costs. For example,
the discussion of the Children of Unmarried Parents Acts in the
1920s, in Chapter Three, illustrates the privatizing impulse of the
legislation:
The three provinces other than Nova Scotia focused
on enabling individuals to bring suits against putative
fathers to compensate for expenses that these
individuals incurred in providing necessities to
illegitimate children. Nova Scotia’s legislation was
initially geared towards compensating the public
18

Gavigan, supra note 16 at 298.
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authorities that bore the costs of illegitimacy by
providing local governments a remedy against the
father.19
With the rise of the welfare state, the ideologies of motherhood
did allow for some limited “legitimate” forms of dependency for
some women,20 but the costs of social reproduction were never fully
socialized.21 In the post-welfare neo-liberal state, there has certainly
been a marked shift again, with the rise of new ideology of
responsibilization and a rejection of the once-limited legitimate
dependency. But, the recognition of the privatizing impulses of the
state in earlier eras surveyed in Autonomous Motherhood is a
reminder that those of us working on questions of privatization and
family law in the neo-liberal era might be well advised to make our
claims with more nuance and precision.
Neo-liberalism as a concept risks becoming both under- and
over-explanatory. This is not to say that it is not or should not be a
relevant analytic, but simply that we ought to take somewhat greater
care in the deployment of a term that is at risk of becoming overly
capacious. Indeed, in my reading of Autonomous Motherhood, I was
struck by the potential relevance of a slightly different feature of
neo-liberal governance—namely, its reliance on self-governance.
Foucault’s work on governmentality described the technologies of
the self as a form of governance “which permit the individual to
19

Boyd et al, supra note 1 at 64.

20

See e.g. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency:
Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State" (Winter 1994) 19:2 Signs
309.

21

Gavigan, supra note 16. See also Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E.
Chunn, “From Mother's Allowance to Mothers Need Not Apply: Canadian
Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal Reform” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall
LJ 733.
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effect by their own means or with the help of others a number of
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts and
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a
certain happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”22
Building on this concept of self-governance, governmentality
scholars such as Nickolas Rose have argued that neo-liberalism
deploys a distinctive form of governance that presupposes the
freedom of the governed; indeed, according to Rose, freedom
becomes the very terrain of the governance.23
Admittedly, my own scholarship has taken a marked turn
towards this concept of self-governance, and no doubt, like a
hammer, I see everything as a self-governing nail.24 Yet the insights
of Autonomous Motherhood seem to be consistent with and
supplemented by the idea that choice has become a central terrain of
neo-liberal self-governance. Returning to the question of
autonomy—so central to Autonomous Motherhood—I would place a
slightly different emphasis on its role. The authors emphasize the
extent to which these women do not question the assumptions of
self-sufficiency, but internalize them. It is not that the single women
in the study have simply been “absorbing” or “internalizing” the
22

Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” in Luther H Martin, Huck
Gutman & Patrick H Hutton, eds, Technologies of the Self (Amherst:
University of Massahusetts Press, 1988) at 18.

23

Nikolas Rose, The Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

24

See e.g. Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural
Regulation of Sex and Belonging (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 2007); Brenda Cossman, “The ‘Opt Out Revolution’ and the
Changing Narratives of Motherhood: Self Governing the Work/Family
Conflict” (2009) Utah L Rev 455; Brenda Cossman “Anxiety Governance”
(Fall 2013) 38 Law and Soc Inquiry 892.
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discourse or ideologies of self-sufficiency; there is a passivity to the
language that gestures towards an older feminist notion of false
consciousness. Rather, I would cast their articulation of their
experiences through the lens of neo-liberal self-governance, where
agency, freedom, and choice have become the very terrain of
governance itself. The women are making choices—as they strongly
expressed. It may seem like I am quibbling with words—not so
much constraints that are internalized—but rather actual agency that
is being exercised, through the normativity of neo-liberal
governance that demands responsibilitization. Yet, for me, this selfgovernance lens allows us to take choice and agency seriously—
these women are really making choices—yet also recognizing the
extent to which choice has become a mechanism of governance.
This is not so much a criticism of Autonomous Motherhood as a
suggestion of some of the ways in which the book provides a rich
basis for further scholarship on feminist agency, choice, and selfgovernance generally and on intimate, familial, and parenting
relationships in particular.
None of my comments should be taken as detracting from my
view that Autonomous Motherhood is a wonderful and welcome
contribution to feminist socio-legal literature. It will be of broad
interest to scholars of socio-legal feminism, feminist legal history,
diversifying family and kinship forms, and critical legal studies. It is
a model of collaborative scholarship, nuanced legal analysis
complemented by empirical sociological research, and rich
theoretical inquiry. As one of the first major studies of women who
choose to parent alone, it raises provocative, timely, and important
questions, and will provide the basis for future scholarship on single
motherhood, relational autonomy, and legal regulation.

